Using spatial econometric models, the paper explores the issue of tax competition among Chinese counties based on county-level panel data of corporate income tax and sales tax from 2000 to 2006. This paper finds that, on the one hand, there exists significantly positive tax competition with respect to corporate income tax and sales tax among Chinese counties, supporting the hypothesis of tax mimicking; on the other hand, the intensity of tax competition with respect to corporate income tax and sales tax for foreign firms among Chinese counties is greater than that for domestic firms, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction of foreign funds having higher mobility than domestic funds.
INTRODUCTION
Since the tax-sharing reform of China in 1994, the central government's taxation power has been partly delegated to local governments. Although having no authority to levy new taxes or determine nominal tax rates, local governments could lower effective tax rates through various tax incentives to enhance the region's competitiveness in attracting capital. Such behaviors will bring about tax competition among local governments in China, an argument made in numerous studies [1] [2] [3] [4] . Regarding its impact, many scholars contend that tax competition may be one engine of China's rapid economic development [5] [6] , whereas others blame it for causing many adverse economic and social consequences [7] .
In the literature, a number of studies have explored tax competition among local governments in China. While the earlier analyses adopt cross-sectional data at the 1 Yanli Zhu, Business School, Institute of Industrial Economics, Hohai University, Jiangsu, China provincial level and find mixed results [1] [2] , panel data is commonly used in more recent studies in view of the deficiencies of single year data. For example, [3] studied provincial panel data from 1999 to 2005 and find positive tax competition in VAT, corporate income tax and property tax with larger intensity than in the foreign studies, but negative tax competition reaction coefficients are found for sales tax and individual income tax. Based on provincial panel data for 1994-2007, [4] also presented positive and significant tax competition effects in tax revenue per capita among Chinese provinces.
In contrast to existing studies on tax competition in China that mostly rely on provincial level data, this paper uses county-level panel data to study the positive tax competition phenomenon, i.e., tax mimicking [3, [8] [9] [10] . After providing evidence in support of the existence of tax competition, we go on to explore how the intensity of such competition varies along different sources of capital. In particular, we obtain county-level paneldata by aggregating firm-level data and employ spatial econometric models to study tax competition among Chinese counties. While the county-level panel data thus constructed contains more detailed information about taxes, spatial econometric models can help mitigate the end ogeneity problem due to spatial correlation. More specifically, two issues are discussed in this study: First, we study the existence and direction of tax competition in corporate income and sales tax rates among Chinese counties within their jurisdiction, using the more detailed data. Second, since foreign capital has higher mobility than domestic funds, we infer that local governments have a stronger motive for tax competition related to foreign firms and thus the intensity of tax competition for foreign firms is stronger than that for domestic firms. While a careful study of the first issue accounts for a main contribution of the current paper, the examination of the second issue allows a further test of the validity of the tax competition theory in explaining China's regional development. To preview the findings, we show that there exists positive spatial tax competition with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates among Chinese counties, supporting the hypothesis of tax mimicking. Furthermore, the intensity of spatial tax competition with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates for foreign firms among Chinese counties is greater than that for domestic firms, which is consistent with the intuition that foreign capital has higher mobility than domestic funds.
The remainder of the paper has the following structure: Model specifications, estimation methods, data description and variable measurement are offered in Section 2. Section 3 presents the empirical findings related to tax competition, compares the different types of regional competition, and discusses the implications. A short conclusion is given in Section 4.
ESTIMATION MODELS AND DATA

Model Specifications
To address the potential issue of spatial correlation among observations of neighboring regions, we use the spatial autoregressive (hereafter, SAR) model to explore tax competition among Chinese counties. The model setup is as follows:
where  is the tax competition reaction coefficient, measuring the intensity that the observations of neighboring regions affect the observation of the region itself. The dependent variable it y is the corporate income or sales tax rate, whereas the exogenous explanatory variables it X include the proportions of private shares (Private%), Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao shares (Htm%), foreign shares (Foreign%), and the proportions of mining sales (Mining%) and public utilities sales (Public utilities%). The first three variables (Private%, Htm% and Foreign%) are used to control for the effect of ownership on effective tax rates, while the other two variables are to control for the disparity in effective tax rates among industries. We choose the first-order contiguity matrix as the spatial weight matrix W. For computational simplicity and to aid in the interpretation of the spatial variables, the weight matrix is row normalized such that the elements in each row sum to 1.
We will further conduct the comparative analysis of tax competition intensity for domestic versus foreign firms by setting the dependent variable to be corporate income or sales tax rates for domestic and foreign firms, respectively, while keeping the same setting as the basic SAR model otherwise.
Data Description
The data used in this paper are county-level panel data on corporate income and sales tax rates from 2000 to 2006, which are aggregated from firm-level data in the database of Chinese large and medium-sized industrial firms. Specifically, we calculate the ratio between the total value of corporate income tax and the total profit of all firms in each county each year to construct corporate income tax rate. Similarly, we calculate the ratio between the total value of corporate sales tax and the turnover of all firms in each county each year to get corporate sales tax rate. Due to missing values in the data, the sample size may vary for different variables. Table 1 gives the summary statistics of main variables used in this paper. The upper part includes all the counties, whether there exist foreign firms in the county or not, while the lower part includes only counties with foreign firm presence. Accordingly, only the sample in the lower part of Table 1 is used to calculate corporate income and sales tax rates for domestic and foreign firms. In Table 1 , Private%, Htm%, Foreign%, Mining%, and Public utilities% denote the proportionsof private shares, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao shares, foreign shares, the proportions of mining sales, and public utilities sales, respectively. The variableW* Tax ratesrefers to the weighted averages of various tax rates in neighboring counties for all firms, and the variables W* Tax rates (domestic)and W* Tax rates (foreign) refer to the weighted averages of various tax rates in neighboring counties for domestic and foreign firms separately. From Table 1 , we see that, the mean of corporate income tax rates is substantially larger than that of corporate sales tax rates in both the upper and lower parts. More importantly, the mean of corporate income or sales tax rates for domestic firms is remarkably larger than that for foreign firms, which may indicate the different tax competition intensities for domestic versus foreign firms. (2) denote the summary statistics of variables employed in the analysis of tax competition with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates among all the counties, whether there exist foreign firms in the county or not, respectively. (3) and (4) denote the summary statistics of variables employed in the analysis of tax competition with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates among counties with foreign firm presence, respectively. 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Baseline Estimation Results
In order to study the direction and intensity of tax competition on corporate income and sales tax rates among Chinese counties within their jurisdiction, we use the SAR model to fit the data. County and year fixed effects are both controlled for, where the former controls for the effects that vary with counties but not time, reflecting the unobserved time-invariant features for each county, while the latter one takes into account of the effects that vary with time but not county, reflecting the unobserved location-invariant features for each year. Table 2reports the estimation results of the SAR model for corporate income and sales tax rates. The tax competition reaction coefficients for income tax and sales tax are0.085 and 0.042, respectively, which are significant at the 1% significance level. It shows that there exists positive spatial tax competition with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates among Chinese counties, supporting the hypothesis of tax mimicking. Compared to the results in the literature, the signs of the tax competition reaction coefficients are consistent with most of studies, but the values are relatively small. The results indicate that the existing studies based on the data at the provincial level may have overestimated the intensity of tax competition in China. In addition, the effects of exogenous variables on tax rates are also in line with our expectations that foreign firms enjoy lower income and sales tax rates, and the sales tax rates for private firms, industries of mining and public utilities are also slightly lower.
Domestic Versus Foreign Firms
In order to compare the tax competition intensity for domestic versus foreign firms with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates, we set the dependent variable to be corporate income or sales tax rates for domestic and foreign firms, respectively, while keeping the same setting as the basic SAR model otherwise. Table 3 presents the estimation results of the SAR model for domestic and foreign firms with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates. For corporate income (sales) tax rates, the tax competition reaction coefficient for domestic firms is 0.014 (0.004), and that for foreign firms is 0.023 (0.010). In other words, the tax competition intensity with respect to corporate income for foreign firms is almost twice as large as that for domestic firms, and the same is true for sales tax rates. We further test the equality of the tax competition reaction coefficients for domestic and foreign firms, with the statistical test showing that the intensity of tax competition with respect to corporate income for foreign firms among Chinese counties is significantly greater than that for domestic firms at the 1% significance level, which is consistent with the intuition that foreign capital has higher mobility than domestic funds. Similar results are also obtained for sales tax rates. In other words, compared to domestic firms, Chinese counties have stronger motives to conduct tax competition for foreign firms. This finding is in line with the fact that local governments are more inclined to give super-national treatment for foreign firms in order to attract funds and advanced technology.
CONCLUSIONS
Using the spatial econometric model, the paper explores the issue of tax competition among Chinese counties using county-level panel data on corporate income and sales tax rates from 2000 to 2006. The comparative analysis of tax competition intensity for domestic versus foreign firms is conducted sequentially.
Our findings include: First, there exists significantly positive tax competition with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates among Chinese counties, supporting the hypothesis of tax mimicking. Specifically, the tax competition reaction coefficients with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates in this paper are around 0.08 and 0.04, which are much smaller than the results in the existing studies, suggesting the existence of greater obstacles in capital mobility among Chinese counties than previously believed. Second, the intensity of tax competition with respect to corporate income and sales tax rates for foreign firms among Chinese counties is greater than that for domestic firms, which is consistent with the theoretical prediction of foreign funds having higher mobility than domestic funds. This implies that tax competition has remained an important way for local governments to attract foreign funds as recent as the beginning of the 21 st century. Tax competition is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it may be an engine of China's rapid economic development. On the other hand, it may also lead to reduced tax base, distorted tax burden, and larger disparity in regional economic development. This paper provides consistent empirical evidence for the preferences of county-level governments on tax competition, which may help governments make more effective policies.
Due to missing values in several variables, the results obtained in this paper can only reflect tax competition among most Chinese counties, which is one of the shortcomings of this study. In addition, tax competition may be an inferior form of institutional competition among local governments in China. How to analyze and evaluate other forms of institutional competition among local governments in China is a topic for future research.
